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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This is a contentious divorce case originally filed in Ada County in January, 2011,
which was eventually transferred to Blaine County as the appropriate venue. The parties,
Robert Kantor and Sondra Kantor, are both law school graduates who spent a large
portion of their lives working in the real estate and business arena rather than practicing
law. Robert last practiced in the early 1980s. The parties were married 43 years.
The parties enjoyed immense success and built a considerable network of
corporate and real property holdings. The downturn in the economy and in the real estate
market did have some impact on the community estate.

Their assets are held in a

complex framework involving a variety of entities, which is partly as a result of business
relationships and partly because of estate planning and/or asset protection. At the time of
the divorce, Robert was 68 years old and Sondra was 65 years old.
The parties did eventually resolve the marital estate by entering into a Property
Settlement Agreement ("PSA"), which was signed on April 24, 2012. R., Vol. I, pp. 146 7 5. Inter alia, because the parties were nearing the end of their careers and did not want
to unravel a lifetime's worth of work (not to mention the potential tax consequences), the
resulting PSA was not the typical clean break. Id. Out of necessity, the parties maintain a
number of ties and business relationships to one another. Id. Unfortunately, this
inescapable ongoing contact has resulted in rising tensions and burgeoning conflict as the
parties' relationship has faltered in the wake of the divorce.
After the parties entered into the PSA, a Judgment was entered in April 2012. R.,
Vol. I, pp. 25-26.

On October 26, 2012, Robert filed a Verified Petition to Divide
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Omitted Assets and Enforce the Property Settlement Agreement. R., Vol. I, pp. 34-61.

That spawned a subsequent Judgment on certain omitted assets on July 30, 2013. R., Vol.
I, pp. 86-100.

During separate litigation between the parties in Blaine County Case No. CV2012-734, the issue of the status of the merger was raised. Sondra filed a Notice of
Submission and Motion to Incorporate the PSA on October 18, 2013. R., Vol. I, pp. 101-

02. The Supplemental Decree was not immediately entered, however, and a hearing on
the motion was delayed by the recusal of the Honorable Ted Israel. Robert initially
objected to the entry of any supplemental decree but subsequently filed a Notice of
Withdrawal of Objection on December 12, 2013, followed by his own Motion for Entry
of Supplemental Judgment on December 20, 2013. R., Vol. I, pp. 130-31, 138-40.

The parties litigated the effective date of the merger before the Magistrate Court.
The Magistrate entered its Supplemental Decree of Divorce on December 26, 2013 nunc
pro tune for October 18, 2013. R., Vol. I, pp. 146-75. The Supplemental Decree was

based upon the PSA, which has been merged and incorporated therein. The entry of a
supplemental decree was authorized by the PSA. Paragraph 24 of the PSA provides, in
pertinent part, that:

However, if either party believes there is a need to seek court involvement with
regard to any provision, that party may submit this agreement to the court and
upon request the court shall incorporate this agreement as a supplemental
judgment of the court.
RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT'S RESPONSE BRIEF -7

R., Vol. I, p. 163, PSA, ,r 24.
Robert did not appeal the entry of the Supplemental Decree or the merger of the
PSA. R., Vol. I, pp. 1-13. In point of fact, Robert's counsel represented that Robert
would stipulate to the merger once the district court ruled on a separate matter in Blaine
County Case No. CV-2012-734. (Transcript of December 6, 2013 hearing, Honorable
Thomas Borreson presiding, p. 29, 1. 14 - p. 32, 1. 25.) During a subsequent contempt
proceeding, Robert raised the jurisdictional issue as part of a motion to dismiss. R., Vol.
II, pp. 225-26. The Magistrate denied the motion and specifically ruled that the
Magistrate had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the Supplemental Decree. (Transcript
of March 21, 2014 hearing, Honorable Thomas Borreson presiding, p. 11, 1. 24 - p. 25, 1.
9.)
The parties appeared for trial on Sondra's Motion for Contempt on May 28, 2014.
(Transcript of May 28, 2014 hearing, Honorable Thomas Borreson presiding, p. 36, 1. 5 p. 53, 1. 18.) The parties settled the contempt proceeding by Robert admitting a single
count of civil contempt and agreeing to a variety of payments to Sondra. Id. As part of
that agreement, Robert reserved his right to appeal the subject matterjurisdiction issue to
this Court. The Magistrate entered a Judgment on September 11, 2014, which was
subsequently corrected by an Amended Judgment Re: Contempt dated December 3, 2014,

nunc pro tune for September 11, 2014. R., Vol. II, pp. 227-30, 246-49.
Robert filed a timely appeal to the district court. R., Vol. II, pp. 231-33. Both
parties submitted briefing, and the District Court ruled on the record without oral
argument. R., Vol. II, pp. 269-275. The District Court failed to address attorney fees and
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costs in its initial decision. Id. Sondra filed a motion for fees and alternate petition for
rehearing. R., Vol. II, pp. 276-77. While that was pending, Robert filed a Notice of
Appeal to this Court. R., Vol. II, pp. 284-89. Sondra filed a Notice of Cross Appeal
regarding the district court's failure to rule on the attorney fee issue only. R., Vol. II, pp.
294-300. The District Court subsequently conducted a hearing on March 30, 2015 and
awarded Sondra attorney fees on the appeal in the amount of $2,650.73 on concurrent
grounds of the contract between the parties and Idaho Code section 12-121. (Transcript
of March 30, 2015 hearing, Honorable Robert Elgee presiding, p. 5, 1. 6-p. 24, 1. 25.)
The District Court's ruling in that regard essentially renders Sondra's Cross Appeal moot,
and the same is being concurrently withdrawn. Sondra acknowledges that the issue of
attorney fees and costs is nevertheless properly before the Court.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the District Court properly uphold the determination of the Magistrate
Court that it did have subject matter jurisdiction to enter the Amended
Contempt Judgment?
2. Did the District Court properly uphold the determination of the Magistrate
Court that it did have subject matter jurisdiction to merge the parties' Property
Settlement Agreement (PSA) into the Supplemental Decree of Divorce?
3. Did the District Court properly award fees and costs on appeal at the District
Court level?
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court is "procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district
court." Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008); Pelayo v.

Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858-59, 303 P.3d 214, 217-18 (2013). When reviewing the
decision of a district court sitting in its capacity as an appellate court, the standard of
review is as follows:
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the
magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of
law follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported and the
conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the
magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of
procedure.

Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858-59, 303 P.3d 214, 217-18 (2013). However, the
Court exercises free review over questions of law. Campbell v. Parkway Surgery Center,

LLC, 158 Idaho 957, 961, 354 P.3d 1172, 1176 (2015).
IV. ARGUMENT

A. The District Court properly affirmed the Magistrate Court's determination that
it had subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
The District Court embraced the central issue of the appeal before it -did the
magistrate court have the jurisdictional power to enforce the PSA? R., Vol. II, p. 272.
The District Court declined to address the propriety of the Magistrate's Court decision to
merge the PSA and noted that Robert did not timely appeal that issue. R., Vol. II, p. 271.
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Sondra acknowledges that the question of jurisdiction is fundamental and must not
be ignored. Diamond v. Sandpoint Title Ins., 132 Idaho 145, 148, 968 P.2d 240, 243
(1998). Subject matter jurisdiction is a key requirement in determining the justiciability
of a claim and cannot be waived by consent of the parties. Troupis v. Summer, 148 Idaho
77, 79-80, 218 P.3d 1138 1140-41 (2009). Jurisdiction depends upon the right of the
court to exercise judicial power over that class of cases to which the particular case
before it belongs and not upon whether the particular case states a cause of action upon
its specific facts. Id., (citing Richardson v. Ruddy, 15 Idaho 488, 98 P. 842, 844-45
(1908)).
The underlying case is a divorce case initiated by Robert Kantor. R., Vol. I, pp.
14-16.

Divorce proceedings are a class of cases that are within the subject matter

jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Division of the District Courts of the State of Idaho. LC.
§§

1-2201,

l-2210(1)(d),

1-2214;

IRCP

82(c)(2)(C);

Fifth

Judicial

District

Administrative Order dated March 23, 2009 (Hon. Barry Wood). Robert availed himself
of the magistrate court's authority not only to achieve the dissolution of the marriage but
also to establish certain property and debt rights. LC. §§ 32-712, 32-713. Robert
subsequently invoked the jurisdiction of the magistrate court even after the entry of the

Judgment in April 2012 by several post-decree filings of his own. R., Vol. I, pp. 34, 138.
Some of those filings occurred during the pendency of the separate litigation in Blaine
County CV-2012-734.

It was disingenuous for him to denounce the power of the

Magistrate Court to hear those matters, and he should be judicially estopped from taking
such a position. Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 492, 502 (2004).
RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT'S RESPONSE BRIEF-11

B. The parties intended the PSA to be merged into a Supplemental Decree.

Regarding the merger, the District Court specifically found the Magistrate Court
"understood this concept completely." R., Vol. II, p. 272. Both the District Court (sitting
in its appellate capacity) and the Magistrate Court found the intent of the parties'
conclusively established by the PSA. R., Vol. II, p. 272. The district court implicitly
noted that the magistrate was correct when it cited to the case of Compton v. Compton,
101 Idaho 328,612 P.2d 1175 (1980). Id. In Compton, the Court held that "Of course,
merger, or its absence, is a question of the parties' intent." Id., 101 Idaho at 332, 612 P.2d
at 1179.
In this case the intent of the parties is easily ascertainable. Paragraph 24 of the
PSA provides, in pertinent part, that:

However, if either party believes there is a need to seek court involvement with
regard to any provision, that party may submit this agreement to the court and

upon request the court shall incorporate this agreement as a supplemental
judgment of the court.
R., Vol. I, p. 163, PSA,

il 24. (Emphasis added.)

This Court revisited the issue of merger again in Barley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171,
233 PJd 102 (2010).

In Barley, the Court clarified the role of the Decree and the

property settlement agreement in the analysis that should be applied by the trial court. Id.,
149 Idaho at 177, 233 P.3d at 108. The Court held:
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In reaching this result, we expressly disaffirm the proposition that the
parties' intent with respect to merger is established by looking at the
language of both the decree of divorce and the property settlement
agreement without first finding that the language in the decree is
ambiguous. The proper analysis is to look first only to the four comers of
the divorce decree. If the language of the decree clearly and

unambiguously holds the property settlement agreement is not merged,
the inquiry is at an end. The court's inquiry will move beyond the four
comers of the decree to the property settlement agreement only when the
decree is ambiguous and reasonably susceptible to conflicting
interpretations.

Id.
In the present case, a Judgment was entered on April 30, 2012. R., Vol. I, p. 25-6.
The Judgment provides, in toto:
BASED UPON the stipulation of the parties, JUDGMENT IS
ENTERED, as follows:

1. DIVORCE: Plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as "Robert") and Defendant
(hereinafter referred to as "Sondra") are granted a divorce from each other
on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Each is restored to the status
of a single person.
2. SEPARATE AGREEMENT: The parties have a separate agreement
resolving all property and debt issues.
Dated this 2ih day of April, 2012.

Isl
The Honorable R. Ted Israel
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The Judgment does not address merger at all. It does not set forth that the PSA is
not merged. Accordingly, the Judgment is inherently ambiguous as to the question of
merger. Whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law. Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson,
151 Idaho 449, 455, 259 P.3d 595, 601 (2011). An ambiguity can be either patent or
latent in nature. Id. A patent ambiguity is clear on the face of the document. Id. Here,
the Judgment just does not address merger or non merger. Absent an express intent not
to merge, merger is presumed. Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 387, 462 P.2d 49, 52
(1969).

The magistrate court in rendering a decree of divorce must make an order for

the disposition of the cornrnunityproperty. LC.§ 32-713.
The Spencer-Steed v. Spencer case at 115 Idaho 338, 766 P.2d 1219 (1988) cited
by Mr. Kantor in support of his Motion to Dismiss Contempt is consistent with the Barley
case. In Spencer-Steed, the litigants specifically set forth in the contract dissolving their
marriage that the agreement would not be merged into a decree with regard to certain
issues including alimony and support of their adult children. The Court found that the
express intent of the parties not to merge those contractual provisions rebutted the
presumption in favor of merger embodied in Phillips, 93 Idaho at 387, 462 P.2d at 52.
As a result, the Court allowed the wife to pursue her claims for alimony and support of
the adult minor children in a separate breach of contract action. Contrary to the SpencerSteed case, the Kantors specifically contracted that the PSA could be merged into a

supplemental order of the divorce court, which has now been done. R., Vol. I, p. 163. The
entry of the Supplemental Decree on December 26, 2013 was not appealed by Mr. Kantor
and, moreover, was sought by Mr. Kantor himself in his December 20, 2013 motion. R.,
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Vol. L pp. 1-13. p. 138-40.

An ambiguity may also be latent in nature. Knipe, 151 Idaho at 455, 151 Idaho at
601. A latent ambiguity exists "where an instrument is clear on its face but loses that
clarity when applied to the facts as they exist." Id. In this case, the Magistrate Court had
to presumptively merge the PSA for the Judgment to be effective. R., Vol. I, pp. 25-26. As
noted in Barley:
In its Decree, the magistrate court specifically approved the Agreement. It
certainly had the jurisdiction to do so under Idaho Code section 32-713,
which provides that the court, in rendering a decree of divorce, must make

an appropriate order for the disposition of the community property.
The court has the power under Idaho Code sections 1-1603 and 1-1901, to
enforce its orders. In this case, because we find that the assets in questionthe convertible notes and stock allocations-were community property at
the time ,of the divorce and divided pursuant to the Agreement, the
magistrate court had jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the terms of the
Agreement.
Barley, 149 Idaho at 178,233 P.3d at 109. (Emphasis added.) If one takes Robert's

position to the extreme - absent any approval of the Court or an order of the Court to
comply with the contract, there has been no disposition of the property and debts in
contravention of LC. § 32-713. This would lead to an absurd result in this case.
Accordingly, the PSA must be considered in interpreting the application of the Judgment
in this case. In considering the PSA, the parties' intent and the resulting merger is quite
clear.
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The merger issue is distinct from the issue of enforcement. Both the district court
and the magistrate court correctly acknowledged that there was not jurisdiction to modify
the property divisions set forth by the parties' agreement in the PSA. R., Vol. II, p. 272.
The Court in Barley discussed the same issue as is raised in this case. Barley, 149 Idaho
at 177-78; 233 P.3d at 108-09. The jurisdiction to modify "is an entirely separate inquiry
from whether the court has jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Agreement." Id.
(emphasis in original.) The enforcement power of the courts stem from Idaho Code
sections 1-1603 and 1-1901. The District Court correctly found the Magistrate Court had
appropriately exercised jurisdiction to enforce the PSA.
C. The PSA has now been merged into the Supplemental Decree and 1s

enfor~eable by the Court through contempt.
"Merger is the substitution of rights and duties under the judgment or the decree
for those under the agreement or cause of action sued upon" Davidson v. Soelberg, 154
Idaho 227, 230, 296 PJd 433, 436 (Ct.App.2013) (quoting Kimball v. Kimball, 83 Idaho
12, 15, 356 P.2d 919, 921 (1960)). The right to enforce the contract through a breach of
contract action is supplanted by the divorce trial court's authority to enforce its order. Id.
LC.§§ 1-1603, 1-1901 and 1-2201.
In the Phillips case, the Court specifically commented on the Court's powers over
property and debt issues:
Other matters of importance in a divorce action are the disposition and
division of the community property of the parties and the award of alimony
or support to the wife. Our statutes place the same jurisdiction,
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responsibility and duty on the district courts in the disposition of these
matters. LC.§ 32-704, 32-706, 32-712, 32-713 and 32-715. There is no
more reason to divest the courts of their jurisdiction by contract of the
parties in these areas than in the area of child support. While perhaps not as
imp01iant to society in general as is the welfare of minor children, these
matters also require a jury and equitable disposition by the courts.
Phillips, 93 Idaho at 387, 462 P.2d at 52.
The courts of the State of Idaho have "the constitutional, statutory and inherent
authority to compel obedience" to their lawful orders. In Re: Wieck, 142 Idaho 275, 278,
127 P.3d 178, 181 (2005); see also, Barley, 149 Idaho at 178,233 P.3d 109 (holding that
Magistrate had power to enforce terms of a property settlement agreement even though it
was not merged· into the decree).
In the present context, the Court's power to enforce its orders is embodied in the
contempt statutes promulgated by the legislature, I.C. §§ 7-601, et seq. Using the grant
of authority under I.C. § 6-1622, the Idaho Supreme Court used its rulemaking authority
to fashion IRCP 75 regarding contempt proceedings. The penalties for contempt are set
forth in I.C. § 7-610. A contempt proceeding entitles a party to due process of law and a
determination that he or she is in contempt in a proper proceeding. Embree v. Embree, 85
Idaho 443, 451, 380 P.2d 216, 221 (1963); see also, Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd,
137 Idaho 850, 865, 55 P.3d 304, 319 (2002). Contempt has long been recognized as a
tool available to the trial Court to enforce its orders in divorce cases. Carr v. Carr, 108
Idaho 684, 688, 701 P.2d 304, 308 (Ct.App.1985); Phillips v. District Court of Fifth

Judicial Dist., 95 Idaho 404, 406-07, 509 P.2d 1325, 1327-28 (1973).
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In this case, the PSA was merged into the Supplemental Decree. R., Vol. I, pp.
146-75. The District Court reviewed the record below and determined that the merger
did not modify the PSA, and that the Magistrate Court acted appropriately. R., Vol. II, pp.
272-73. The District Court noted that once the PSA was merged, it became an order of
the court and was enforceable through the contempt power. R., Vol. II, pp. 273-74.
Accordingly, the District Court properly affinned the decision of the Magistrate Court.
R., Vol. II, p. 274. Sondra respectfully submits that the District Court's decision should
be affirmed by this Court as a matter of procedure. Pelayo, 154 Idaho at 858-59, 303 P.3d
at 217-18.
D. The District Court appropriately awarded attorney fees to Sondra on the initial
appeal.
Following the favorable decision on the appeal to the District Court, Sondra
moved for an award of attorney fees and costs. R., Vol. II, pp. 276-77. Sondra asserted
her claim for fees and costs under Paragraph [29] of the PSA and under Idaho Code
section 12-121. Id. Robert objected to the request on the basis that each party had agreed
to pay their own fees and costs. R., Vol. II, pp. 290-92. The District Court rejected that
argument and awarded Sondra fees and costs. (Transcript of March 30, 2015 hearing,
Honorable Robert Elgee presiding, p. 17, 1. 10 - p. 18, 1. 25.) Robert did not object to
any particular claimed expense or the amount of fees.

A party moving to disallow

attorney fees and costs must specifically state the objections thereto. Smith v. Mitton, 140
Idaho 893, 901, 104 P.3d 367,375 (2004). Failing to object to the amount of the claimed
fees constitutes a waiver on that issue. Wefco, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 111 Idaho 55, 720
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P.2d 643 (Ct.App. 1986) overruled on other grounds by Borchand v. Wefco, Inc., 112
Idaho 555 (1987).
The court may award reasonable attorney fees in a civil action "when provided for
by any statute or contract." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). It is well settled that a party claiming
attorney fees must assert the specific contractual provision, statute, rule, or case authority
for its claim. Henderson v. Henderson Inv. Prop., LLC, 148 Idaho 638, 641-42, 227 P.3d
568, 571-72 (2009); Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430,438, 80 P.3d 1031, 1039 (2003).
A generalized request for attorney fees is not sufficient. Garner, 139 Idaho at 438. An
award of attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and subject to
review for an abuse of discretion. Henderson, 148 Idaho at 639, 227 P.3d at 569; Chavez
v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 224, 192 P.3d 1036, 1048 (2008).

Thus, the relevant inquiry

is: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether
the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr.,
Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
In this case, one basis for consideration of an award of attorney fees and costs
relied upon by the District Court is the PSA. (Transcript of March 30, 2015 hearing,
Honorable Robert Elgee presiding, p. 17, 1. 10 - p. 18, 1. 25.) Paragraph [29].03 of the
PSA provides that "If action is instituted to enforce any of the terms of this Agreement,
then the losing party agrees to pay to the prevailing party all costs and attorneys' fees
incurred in that action." R., Vol I., p. 164. Such provisions have provided a sufficient
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basis for an award of fees and costs on appeal. See, e.g., Bondy v. Levy, 119 Idaho 961,
966, 812 P.2d 268, 273 (1991). The District Court agreed with Sondra that she did not
agree to waive attorney fees and costs on appeal. The appeal is a separate action and the
fees and costs awarded by the District Court were appropriate.
An award of attorney's fees and costs under LC. § 12-121 is proper "'only where
the Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.'" Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v.

Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 95, 982 P.2d 917, 930 (1999) (quoting Lanham v. Idaho Power
Co., 130 Idaho 486, 500, 943 P.2d 912, 926 (1997)) (quoting Thompson v. Pike, 125
Idaho 897, 901, 876 P.2d 595, 599 (1994)).

For an award of attorney fees pursuant to

I. C. § 12-121, the Court must find that the Plaintiffs entire pursuit of this action was
frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation. Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 639,
132 P.3d 392, 396 (2006). "If there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact or a legitimate
issue of law, attorney fees may not be awarded under this statute even though the losing
party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation." Id.
In this case, Robert's pursuit of the appeal was unreasonable. As pointed out by
the Magistrate Court and the District Court, Robert agreed that the PSA could be merged.
R., Vol. I, p. 163, PSA,

~

24. Robert subsequently invoked the jurisdiction of the

magistrate court even after the entry of the Judgment in April 2012 by several post-decree
filings of his own. R., Vol. I, pp. 34, 138. Robert initially objected to the entry of any
supplemental decree but subsequently filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Objection on
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December 12, 2013, followed by his own Afotion for Entry of Supplemental Judgment on
December 20, 2013. R., Vol. I, pp. 130-31, 138-40. In point of fact, Robert's counsel
represented that Robert would stipulate to the merger once the district court ruled on a
separate matter in Blaine County Case No. CV-2012-734. (Transcript of December 6,
2013 hearing, Honorable Thomas Borreson presiding, p. 29, I. 14-p. 32, I. 25.)
The District Court noted:
Mr. Kantor acquiesced to the jurisdiction. He requested the jurisdiction.
He accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. And then he said, well, but you
don't have the power to impose contempt.
(Transcript of March 30, 2015 hearing, Honorable Robert Elgee presiding, p. 19, LL 1215.)
The District Court went on to say:
This is a very simple, discrete issue. Did the judge have jurisdiction, yea or
nay. And if he did, which I think he did and I think it's clear he did, then
the appeal in my view is groundless.
Id. at p. 21, LL 22-25.)
Accordingly, the award of attorney fees entered by the District Court should
likewise be sustained.

V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the District Court properly found that Magistrate
appropriately denied Robert's Motion to Dismiss and ruled that it had jurisdiction to
merge the PSA into the Supplemental Decree.

The District Court noted that the

Magistrate carefully considered the intent of the parties in that regard and found the intent
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was quite clear in accordance with Paragraph 24 of the PSA.

Once merged, the

Magistrate had the authority to proceed with the contempt action, which was affirmed by
the District Court as a proper decision. The District Court's award of attorney fees and
costs should likewise be upheld. Robert's appeal should be denied.
VI. ATTORNEY FEES

Sondra Kantor moves for an award of attorney fees and costs related to this appeal
in accordance with I.A.R. 40, 41, Idaho Code section 12-121 and Paragraph 29 of the
PSA. As set forth more fully in Paragraph IV.D. above, Sondra should be entitled to an
award of attorney fees and costs on this appeal. Sondra has a contractual right to attorney
fees under the PSA. Paragraph [29].03 of the PSA provides that "If action is instituted to
enforce any of the terms of this Agreement, then the losing party agrees to pay to the
prevailing party all costs and attorneys' fees incurred in that action." R., Vol I., p. 164.
Such provisions have provided a sufficient basis for an award of fees and costs on appeal.
See, e.g., Bondy v. Levy, 119 Idaho 961,966,812 P.2d 268,273 (1991). This appeal is an
enforcement action of the PSA.
Sondra should likewise be awarded attorney fees and costs under Idaho Code
section 12-121. Thomas, 142 Idaho at 639, 132 P.3d at 396. As set forth more fully in
Paragraph IV.D,, Robert repeatedly availed himself of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate
Court. In fact, he requested it himself and indicated through counsel he would stipulate
to it. Only when faced with contempt did he attempt to deprive the Court of jurisdiction.
The Magistrate Court clearly had jurisdiction to enforce the PSA. Barley, 149 Idaho at
177-78; 233 P.3d at 108-09. Sondra did not waive her right to request attorney fees and
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costs on this appeal. Accordingly, an award of fees and costs under Idaho Code section
1 121 is appropriate.
DATED this

lf

day of November, 2015.
THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF
ANDERSON WILKINSON
& BIRCH, PLLC

By~-f-1__,;L--::.ut___~"
=----Marty 'Anderson
Attom ys for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a licensed attorney in Idaho, with my
l'l

office in Idaho Falls, and that on the ~ a y of November, 2015, I served a true and
correct copy of the following-described document on the parties listed below, by mailing,
with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be hand delivered.
DOCUMENT SERVED:

RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT'S
RESPONSE BRIEF

PARTIES SERVED:
Daniel A. Miller, Esq.
LUDWIG SHOUFLER MILLER JOHNSON, LLP
401 West Front Street, Suite 401
Boise, Idaho 83702
Facsimile: (208) 387-1999
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